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In the early decades of the last century, scholars largely interpreted Johann Georg Hamann as a 
singular opponent of the Enlightenment, a “prophet” of irrationalism, and the real force behind 
the Sturm und Drang’s repudiation of the alleged prerogatives of rational knowledge.1 Scholars 
debated whether some mix of mythology, mysticism, Gnosticism, or pantheism accompanied 
that rejection,2 but the common thrust of those interpretations set the stage for Isaiah Berlin’s 
influential portrayal of Hamann as a “pioneer of anti-rationalism.”3  
 
To a certain extent, this assessment can be traced to a deliberately iconoclastic style. Hamann’s 
writings are often “fragments of fragments,”4 laced with irony, parody, and barbs (both friendly 
and otherwise), replete with expansive, often recondite allusions.5 His style expresses a patent 
disdain for fashionable means of expression, especially those that valued “clarity and impersonal 
                                               
1 Unger 1911, I, 582; Weber 1917; Gundolf 1911, 197; Korff 1923; Stefansky 1923, 146; Burger 
1929; for a review of research on Hamann during this period, see Nadler 1937. 
2 Unger 1911, I, 75; Strich 1910, 2, 321-22; 
3 Berlin 1993, 4.  
4 Cassirer 1916, 109. 
5 See the dedication on page 61 of the second volume of Johann Georg Hamann, Samtliche 
Werke, hrsg. J. Nadler, Six Volumes (Vienna: Herder, 1949-1957); allusions to writings of 
Heraclitus, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Pope, Shaftesbury, and Edward Young all 
appear on this one-page dedication. Henceforth ‘N’ stands for this Nadler edition, followed by 
the number of the volume and page number. See, too, Briefwechsel, volumes 1-3, hrsg. Walther 
Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel (Wiesbaden: Insel, 1955-1957); volumes 4-7, hrsg. Arthur Henckel 
(Wiesbaden: Insel, 1959; Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1965-1979); hereafter ‘ZH’ followed by a 
number indicating the volume of the edition, a comma, and the page number.  
 demonstration” at the expense of past authorities, not least Scripture, and personal experience.6 
Not surprisingly, in the 18th century, even as they marveled at his originality and incisiveness, 
Mendelssohn and Kant took particular issue with Hamann’s style,7 a sentiment influentially 
echoed and amplified by Goethe and Hegel in the early 19th century8 (though not shared by 
Kierkegaard or Nietzsche9). 
 
                                               
6 Unger 1911, I, 298-300; Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language, edited by Kenneth 
Haynes (Cambridge University Press, 2007), xii. People have become so “daft” (blöd) and 
“deferential” (sittsam), Hamann writes, “that one has to insult if one wants to say or hear the 
truth” (N2, 183); hence, the Socratic Memorabilia’s first dedication: “to the public or the 
familiar nobody” (N2, 59).  
7 According to Mendelssohn, Hamann “could have been one of our best writers but became one 
of the most reproachable through a desire to be an original” (Gesammelte Schriften: Jubilaeum 
Ausgabe, Band 5, 1, bearbeitet von Eva J. Engel (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: frommann-holzboog, 
1991) 5,1: 200-206, 441, 558-66. Kant pleas with Hamann to write him “if possible, in the 
language of human beings, since, poor son of the earth that I am, I am not equipped for the 
divine language of intuitive reason” (Corr, 10:156, Nr. 86).  
8 Goethe lauds Hamann’s holism – countering a rigid division of knowing, acting, and feeling 
(Mendelssohn, Kant) – but faults him for failing to see that language demands abstraction. (Since 
Hamann’s holism must countenance “gaps and lacks,” Dickson argues that ‘relationality’ is a 
more appropriate term here; Dickson 1995, 320-22). Goethe takes a parting shot at the air of 
superiority (“more ironic than heartfelt”) that he finds Hamann adopting toward his 
correspondents; see J. W. Goethe, Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit, Band 3 
(Tübingen: Cotta, 1814); Werke, Band XI, hrsg. E. Trunz (München: Beck, 1981), 512-516. 
Hegel is even more critical of Hamann’s character, tracing his writings’ “unintelligibility” and 
“unpleasantness” to a smug self-absorption, an “abstract interiority,” leaving his readers with 
nothing but style; see “Hamanns Schriften (1828)” in G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, Band XI (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970) 281, 310, 332; for helpful commentary, see Anderson 2008, xxiv-
xxv and McCumber 1997, 78-81). 
9 Weber 1917; Lowrie 1950, 3-4; Dunning 1979; Gray 2012. 
 Still, in the past half century, this traditional portrait of Hamann has given way to a more 
nuanced reading. Scholars observe, for example, that neither ‘reason’ nor Aufklärung had a 
univocal meaning at the time, that Hamann appears on the scene long after the vehement battles 
between Pietists and key spokespersons for the German Enlightenment,10 and that, like Lessing 
and Kant, he is as much a student of the Enlightenment as its critic.  Neither has it been lost on 
students of the history of philosophy how profoundly Hamann anticipates directions philosophy 
has taken – with reason – over the last two centuries.11  
 
Hamann has, furthermore, not merely self-serving reasons for crafting a protreptic style of 
writing that goes against the currents of the time. At the outset of his “elegy” to Socrates, he 
speaks of writing “about Socrates in a Socratic manner,” with such a confluence of ideas and 
sensations that the sentences become a group of islands without “bridges and ferries,” requiring 
readers who can “swim.”12 So, too, his writings are, as he puts it, entre chien et loup, that period 
before daybreak when it is not yet possible to make out the difference between a dog and a wolf. 
Far from being unintelligible, the image points to what will be possible, readying readers for the 
task. In both these respects he does stylistic battle, not simply against abstract, universal concepts, 
but against the indifference and disengagement that the indulgence of those abstractions entails.13 
 
                                               
10 Listening to F. A. Schultz, a major representative of the synthesis of the two movements, one 
would think, Hippel remarks, that Christ and St. Paul had studied with Christian Wolff; 
Jørgensen 1968, 163-64; Alexander 1966, 162-63; Dickson 1995, 13. 
11 O’Flaherty 1979, 82-99; Jørgensen 1968, 164; Dickson 1995, 13-19; Betz 2012, 2-7, 15-21; 
Wohlfart 1984, 402. 
12 N2, 61; Unger 1911, I, 15; Wolfahrt 1984, 400 n. 13. 
13 ZH5, 289-92; ZH6, 295; N3, 410; Unger 1911, I, 9; on verbal imagery (Wortbild), cento, 
fables, and burlesque as the main ingredients of his style; see Nadler 1949, 462-65; Cassirer 
1916, 172-73; on the roles of sensuality and passion thereby, see N2, 201; N3, 234.  
 There are, finally, ample texts where Hamann valorizes reason, deeming it not only 
indispensable to religion and faith, but fully in accord with revelation.14 Moreover, like any 
criticism, Hamann’s criticisms of reason suppose a particular construal of what is criticized as 
well as a particular standard for the criticism. Hence, it is commonplace today to regard Hamann 
as a critic, not of reason itself, but of certain views of reason.15 
 
But then what is Hamann’s conception of reason?  Perhaps more to the point, what conception of 
of reasoning is operative in his thinking generally and in his criticisms of certain uses of reason 
in particular? Given the overriding importance of religion in his thinking, we should also ask in 
this connection: what is the place of reason within religion? By examining – in part one – some 
of his key criticisms of Kant’s conception of reason, the following paper endeavors to take some 
steps – in part two – toward answering these questions.16 By exposing a certain naiveté, if not 
negligence regarding the topic of language and, in particular, the language operative in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Hamann succeeds in indicating a potentially serious blind spot 
in the critical philosophy. Hamann mounts his criticism from an ontological standpoint that is 
inseparable from his Christology, i.e., an understanding of the Incarnation as the focal point and 
final meaning of history. This onto-Christological conception of reason is unique, complex, and 
insightful. Yet students of his thinking, perhaps awe-struck by these qualities, generally 
understate the underdetermined yet pretentious character of that conception, to which I turn 
briefly in conclusion. 
 
1.  Reasoning against Pure Reason  
Hamann has two discussions, both unpublished, apparently out of deference for Kant,17 that are 
devoted to the first edition of the CPR: a Recension from 1781 (hereafter: Review) and the 
                                               
14 N3, 231: “Ohne Sprache hätten wir keine Vernunft, ohne Vernunft keine Religion…”; ZH7: 
165: “Glaube hat Vernunft eben so nötig als diese jenen hat.” 
15 Dickson 1995, 20 note 59; Bayer (1998) depicts Hamann as a radikaler Aufklärer. 
16 For earlier attempts, see O’Flaherty 1979, 82-100 and Dickson 1995, 17-21. 
17 Bayer 2002, 64, 204-06. 
 Metacritique on the Purism of Pure Reason (hereafter: Metacritique), probably completed in 
1784.18  
  
1.1 The Review  
Hamann’s first explicit criticism in the Review is directed at the abstractness of the deductions in 
the CPR and the pretentiousness of its ambitions. After noting that Kant dubs ‘transcendental’ 
the knowledge that is concerned, not with objects themselves, but with a priori concepts of 
objects, Hamann identifies the CPR with “the complete idea of a transcendental philosophy” (N3, 
277). The momentousness of this enterprise, if successful, is not lost on Hamann. Under this 
“new name,” he notes, “the age-old metaphysics is transformed all at once from a two millennia 
battle-field of endless disputes into a systematically ordered inventory of all our possessions 
through pure reason” (ibid.). This metaphysics propels itself, Hamann adds sardonically, on the 
wings of “a rather abstract genealogy and heraldry to the regal dignity and Olympian hope,” 
unique among sciences, of “experiencing its absolute completion.” Moreover, it purports to do so 
– rather preposterously, Hamann insinuates – without recourse to arts of magic, but solely from 
principles “holier than those of religion and more majestic than those of the law-giver” (ibid.). 
 
Hamann’s reference to “a rather abstract genealogy and heraldry” echoes familiar difficulties 
with Kant’s metaphysical and transcendental deductions. Yet, instead of belaboring this point, he 
presses his criticism of the project’s abstractness by questioning the very possibility of 
metaphysics and the alleged role of reason in establishing that possibility.  
What and how much can understanding and reason know free from all  
experience? How much may I hope to establish [ausrichten] with reason if all the 
R1  stuff and help of experience is taken away from me?  Is there any human 
knowledge independent of all experience or, equivalently, any form independent 
of all matter? (N3, 277-78) 
The possibility of this metaphysics turns on the question of the possibility of a priori knowledge.  
The first question in R1 is taken, practically verbatim, from the Preface to the CPR (Axvii), 
                                               
18 For the history of Hamann’s relationship to Kant, see Weber 1904; Wohlfart 1984, 398-404; 
Betz 2012, 34-38.  
 though Mendelssohn now raises it as a rhetorical question. The subsequent questions simply call 
into question the possibility of attaining a priori knowledge, as Kant conceives it. The questions 
are by no means the rants of a religious zealot. To the contrary, they challenge the intelligibility 
of such knowledge, allegedly attained through abstracting (absondern) and entertaining pure 
forms of thinking (e.g., the logical forms of judgment as sources of pure concepts of the 
understanding).  
 
Kant’s claims for the possibility of a priori knowledge suppose, furthermore, a difference 
between the concepts a priori and a posteriori, prompting Hamann to ask: In what does the 
formal difference between these concepts consist? He is not disputing a difference along these 
lines as such, but precisely the formal difference, as though it were accessible or meaningful 
apart from the content of experience. The implication is not that the difference between the 
formal and the material is material rather than formal but rather that these differences themselves, 
to the extent that they are meaningful, are found in experience.19  
 
Experience, as Hamann understands it here, includes the experience of ourselves and the activity 
of our minds. He contends that Kant’s formally drawn contrasts are not necessary and universal 
but contingent, rooted and thus combined in that experience. 
Are prius and posterius, analysis and synthesis, not natural correlates and 
contingent opposites, yet both grounded, like the receptivity of the subject to the 
R2  predicate, in the spontaneity of our concepts? ... To what end such a violent, 
unjustified severing of what nature has placed together? Will not the two stems ... 
wither through this dichotomy and division of their transcendental root? (N3, 278) 
In the CPR Kant appears to take formal logic’s necessity and universality for granted, along with 
the a priori concepts and analytic judgments that it supposedly contains. Yet even if, as some 
                                               
19 Along similar lines Hamann questions, too, the project of a metaphysics of nature (for which 
the CPR is merely preparatory), given that its “entire content must be nothing but form without 
content.” When he then asks, by comparison, whether there was any schematism “purer” than the 
syllogistic structure, Hamann is likely appealing to the modern prejudice that the Scholastic, 
Aristotelian approach to science impeded understanding of nature (N3, 278).  
 argue, formal logic is subordinate to transcendental considerations in some sense, Hamann’s 
criticism in this regard remains fundamental, effectively calling into question any privileging of 
an allegedly a priori, purely formal science. The same applies to the transcendental philosophy’s 
fundamental distinctions (prius and posterius, analysis and synthesis). By comparing their 
grounding in experience to that of the receptivity of a grammatical subject to a predicate, he 
suggests that these distinctions have the same standing as grammar or, more pointedly, they have 
a grammatical status.20 In short, Hamann throws down the gauntlet at Kant’s contention that 
rational differences and oppositions are not the products of experience in the broad sense noted 
above (namely, including experience of the activity of our minds). This explains, too, his 
characterization of those oppositions as “natural” and “contingent” (though he may also have in 
mind the fact that, supposed by reason as they are, those oppositions cannot be founded – short 
of begging the question – upon some sort of rational necessity).   
 
The final two questions in R2 – iterated with slight changes in the Metacritique (N3, 286) – take 
aim at Kant’s allusion to a single unknown root of knowledge’s two stems (sensoriness and 
understanding). Despite or rather by virtue of being opposites, the two stems have a natural unity 
that Hamann locates, as discussed below, in language.  
 
In the Review Hamann also depicts the Transcendental Dialectic’s supposed missteps as pudenda 
(a word doing double duty for shame and vagina) and the Paralogism and the Antinomies as 
“autocheirie or euthanasia.” While no doubt meant to shock, the images flag his view not merely 
that the very idea of transcendental reason is a perversion but that it perverts precisely by 
eschewing thinking’s natural, carnal character.  In the process Hamann also sets up an ironic 
contrast with the “mystical unity” of pure reason of the Transcendental Ideal, as he puts it (N3, 
279). The barb behind this characterization becomes clear, as he adds that Kant’s observation 
about Plato applies to Kant himself. Kant says that he cannot follow Plato’s “mystical 
deduction...or the exaggerations through which he, as it were, hypostasizes them” (A314n).  
While applauding Kant’s critique of such deductions and, with them, all speculative theology, 
                                               
20 “With Luther, I make all philosophy into a grammar,” signifying only per analogiam (ZH7, 
169); Bayer 2002, 103-05. 
 Hamann objects to construing God as an idea, a unity that cannot be experienced but is produced 
by pure reason, hypostasized as the guiding principle for research. “People speak of reason as if 
it were an actual entity and of dear God as if God were nothing but a concept.”21  
 
Hamann ends the Review by challenging the claim on the CPR’s final page that, after dogmatism 
and skepticism, the critical path alone remains. The claim hearkens back to the Preface’s 
reference to a post-dogmatic and post-skeptical indifferentism as the forerunner to Kant’s critical 
philosophy: “the mother of chaos and night, in sciences, yet at the same time the origin, at least 
the foreplay of their transformation” (AX-XII). Yet indifferentism, Hamann submits, towards 
what no human being can be indifferent to either is “the profoundest hypocrisy” or belongs to 
“the fatal laziness of the age.” The implication that Hamann would have us draw is patent: the 
critical philosophy fails to achieve its vaunted goal of moving beyond that indifferentism and the 
resignation, despair, and laziness it entails and deceives itself into thinking that it does.22  
 
1.2 The Metacritique23 
The Metacritique begins with a quotation from Hume approving Berkeley’s assertion that “all 
general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more 
extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, similar to 
them.”24 The “new skepticism,” Hamann adds, owes infinitely more to “the old idealism” than 
this quotation might suggest, such that “without Berkeley, Hume would hardly have become the 
great philosopher that the Critique, from a position of similar indebtedness alleges him to be.”25   
 
                                               
21 ZH7, 26; ZH4, 293-94.  
22 N3, 279-80; Wohlfart 1984, 404-5; Bayer 2002, 130-42. 
23 “Metacritique” signifies at once a critique of critique, a self-critique, but also a basis for 
criticism beyond (meta-) that of the CPR; N2, 83; N3, 29, 223, 401; the term ‘purism’ is derived 
from the effort to purify a language of foreign words; see Bayer 2002, 209n9.   
24David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London, 1739), edited by Selby-Bigge, second 
edition by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), 17. 
25 N3, 283; ZH4, 376; Bayer 2002, 210, 216; Betz 2012, 24. 
 Kant, of course, is the last person to deny his indebtedness to Hume. Yet if, as some contend, the 
point of this opening quotation were primarily to identify his dependency on his British 
predecessors, it would be a curious choice—curious because it identifies precisely what Kant 
failed to assimilate from that tradition. ‘Dependency,’ moreover, can mean many things.  A 
suspension bridge, for example, depends upon materials, anchoring, design, the strength of local 
winds, and a host of other factors.  But while its make-up and viability are, we might say, 
“constitutively dependent” upon its materials and, thereby, upon their having being secured from 
somewhere, it is irrelevant whether they were secured in Ohio or Montana.  So, too, the viability 
of a position or work stands or falls on its own, regardless of the origin of its constitutive features.  
In other words, if the point of Hamann’s opening salvo is to indicate the CPR’s dependency upon 
the tradition of Berkeley and Hume, he needs to explain the nature of the dependency.  
 
But he is apparently not interested in doing any such thing. Indeed, the mere mention of Berkeley 
calls attention to a recent review of the CPR, linking it with Berkeley’s idealism.26 Yet, instead 
of rehearsing any idealism charge, Hamann’s opening citation draws attention to a salient 
difference between Kant and his predecessors across the channel: their nominalism.27  
 
So the point of this opening passage is not primarily to acknowledge Kant’s dependency upon 
his British predecessors, but rather to insinuate that Kant fails to understand Hume because he 
fails to appreciate the full impact of Berkeley’s nominalism on Hume’s thought. Kant’s response 
to Hume’s skepticism falters, Hamann is suggesting, precisely for this reason. To the extent that 
                                               
26 Kant was incensed by the anonymous review (by Garve and Feder), even the original that 
Garve subsequently sent him, complaining of being “treated like an imbecile” (ZH 5, 107; Bayer 
2002, 216). Christian Garve/Johann Feder. “Rezension, Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft” in: Zugabe zu den Göttingischen Anzeigen vorgelehrten Sachen (19.1.1782): 40-48. 
27 As is here the case, Hamann’s endorsement of nominalism is short on examples, argument, 
and content. It may also be inconsistent. “Being” and “reason,” he claims, are “mere 
relations,…no things but pure Schulbegriffe” and “realism and idealism” a product of 
Schulvernunft, but he also champions existence and “historical and physical realism”; ZH7, 156-
57, 165-73; see, too, ZH5, 264, 271; N3, 106, 191, 225. 
 the critical response depends upon a different, more substantive account of general ideas (i.e., the 
alleged universality and necessity of pure concepts of the understanding), it is bound to fail.28  
 
The following jab at any pretense to profundity (when it comes to the nominalist insight) lends 
support to this interpretation. 
But as far as [Berkeley’s] important discovery is concerned, it is apparent and  
M1  uncovered, without any particularly profundity, in the mere use of language of the 
most common perception and observation of the sensus communis.29 
In other words, one hardly needs Berkeley’s system to recognize that “abuse of language,” as 
Berkeley puts it, that seduces us into countenancing “abstract general ideas,” as though words 
have a general use only by reason of referring, not to several particular ideas, but one abstract, 
general idea.30 The discovery becomes apparent the moment we attend to the way we commonly 
perceive in tandem with our socially instituted uses of language. 
 
The insinuation that Kant does not make this discovery sets the stage for the next major 
contention of the Metacritique. Echoing a rebuke made in the Review (R2), Hamann contends 
that the alleged purity of pure reason is impossible. What renders Kant’s project impossible is, 
Hamann alleges, its pretension to have access to concepts and intuitions “purified” of any 
experience.   
One of the hidden secrets whose task, let alone solution, supposedly has not 
entered into the heart of a single philosopher hitherto is the possibility of human 
knowledge of objects of experience without and before any experience and, after  
M2 this, the possibility of a sensory intuition before any sensation of an object.  The 
matter and form of a Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and Method is 
grounded on this twofold impossibility…. (N3, 283)  
                                               
28 To be sure, Hamann faults Kant for his idealism, charging him with the mysticism he attributes 
to Berkeley. But what underlies Kant’s idealism is what Berkeley saw past: general ideas. 
29 N3, 283; see Hamann’s translation of Shaftesbury’s Sensus communis in N4, 155-91. 
30  George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Dublin: 
Rhaymes, 1710); edited by Kenneth Winkler (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), 17. 
 Thus, whereas M1 flags Hamann’s nominalism, M2 confirms his commitment to a kind of 
empiricism, as he refers sarcastically to the principles of pure understanding (Grundsätze des 
reinen Verstandes) and the pure intuitions of space and time. Kant’s own view, to be sure, is that 
there is no experience without the former and no sensation without the latter. In Hamann’s view, 
however, the unity of concepts as well as temporal and spatial relations with sensations is 
fundamental, and on this basis he militates against the ideas that either a priori knowledge or 
pure intuition is possible. Hamann does not argue for this impossibility, perhaps because he 
realized the difficulty of doing so. The difficulty is twofold: first, knowledge of objects in 
advance of their manifestation is commonplace (consider a carpenter’s draft of a table), so the 
nature of the impossibility has to be spelled out to preclude such instances; second, it’s one thing 
to be skeptical of the possibility of something, another thing to claim its impossibility and, 
indeed, to do so without venturing into metaphysics or, in Kantian jargon, without making 
synthetic a priori claims. 
 
Yet, while not mounting an argument for the twofold impossibility on which the CPR allegedly 
rests, Hamann observes that a particular conception of reason motivates Kant to pursue this 
hopeless task. That conception is related but not identical to a traditional conception that Kant 
also countenances, i.e., reason as the capacity to infer in contrast to capacities to conceive 
(understanding) and to judge.31 Reason in this traditional sense can be an object of knowledge, 
source of knowledge, or type of knowledge.  But for Kant, in addition to this traditional 
differentiation of reason from other cognitive faculties,  
…there is a more universal, sharper, and purer distinction, by virtue of which 
reason underlies all objects, sources, and types of knowledge; yet is itself none of 
the three; and consequently needs neither an empirical or aesthetic nor a 
M3 logical or discursive concept, but consists instead merely in subjective conditions, 
under which everything, something, and nothing can be thought ..., given, ... and 
taken. (N3, 283-84) 
                                               
31 This differentiation of cognitive capacities corresponds to the three traditional parts of logic 
(Begriffs-, Urteils- und Schlußlehre), along which the Transcendental Logic divides. 
 This remark, while ignoring qualifications in the CPR,32 draws on a broad sense of reason 
sketched in the CPR’s Preface as well as in the opening sections of the Prolegomena.   
 
According to the Preface to the CPR, for example, “human reason” raises questions it cannot 
answer and has recourse to principles that overstep every possible use of experience, principles 
with which “common human reason” stands in agreement (A vii-viii). An indifference produced 
by the impasse between dogmatism and skepticism compels reason to take up “the most difficult 
of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge,” with the aim of adjudicating between justified 
claims and groundless conjectures (anticipating the conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic 
and Dialectic respectively).33 Kant thus assigns to Vernunft (no longer qualified as human reason 
or common human reason) the task of self-critique, indeed, self-critique according to “eternal 
and unchangeable laws.” When he depicts the undertaking as “the critique of pure reason itself,” 
it is clear that the genitive is both objective and possessive, i.e., a critique of and by pure reason. 
By ‘critique,’ Kant adds, he means not a critique of books or systems, but a critique of the 
“faculty of reason in general, in regard to all sorts of knowledge [Erkenntnisse] that it may strive 
for, independent of all experience” (Axii). This critique decides, we are told, the possibility or 
impossibility of a metaphysics altogether, while determining its sources and scope from 
principles.   
 
So Hamann is challenging reason in this broad sense where it occupies the position of being both 
the object and the subject of the critique, i.e., both the party responsible for judgments and the 
one passing judgment on them. The reason sketched in M3 is, to borrow a term from Kant’s 
moral philosophy, autonomous.  It sits in judgment by determining the possible objects of 
knowledge, the sources of knowledge, and types of knowledge (a priori/a posteriori, 
analytic/synthetic). But it is hard to see why reason is not then a victim of its own splendid 
isolation, its purity, since it is not itself beholden to any of the objects, sorts, or sources of 
knowledge that it underlies. Reason is supposed to pass judgment but, so construed, lacks any 
                                               
32 See, above all, the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic (A298-309). 
33 In the Preface Kant also speaks of “the point of reason’s misunderstanding with itself,” a 
comment no doubt made with the Transcendental Dialectic in mind (Axii, A309) 
 access to a basis for doing so. Hamann exploits this difficulty, exposing the unreasonableness of 
a concept of reason that is, strictly speaking, neither empirical nor logical nor, for that matter, 
transcendental (since it sits in judgment of all three uses).34 The backhanded gloss on Kant’s 
conception of reason in M3 thus reveals Hamann’s own heteronomous conception of reason. 
 
Hamann drives home this criticism of the unreasonableness of the concept of pure reason in the 
CPR by challenging its “purity” in three respects, namely, its alleged independence of 
(1) a heritage, tradition, and belief (Überlieferung, Tradition und Glauben); 
(2) experience and its everyday inductions; and  
(3) language (N3, 284). 
Hamann does not dwell on the first purification, and that is regrettable, given the range of 
meanings of the three terms (What difference does he hear between Überlieferung and Tradition? 
How specifically does he intend his readers to take Glauben, i.e., is it meant to range over any or 
only certain important doxic attitudes? What is the significance of linking it to tradition?). 
Nevertheless, the import of the challenge is clear: how can it be reasonable to think that reason or, 
better, reasoning is detachable from the heritage, tradition, and beliefs – in short, the history – 
that the reasoner lives and breathes?  
Each purification is a misstep, but Hamann dubs the second “more transcendent” than the 
first, probably because the past, too, was once an experience. The term ‘experience,’ as Hamann 
wields it here, is meant to include the entire field of human sensoriness.  His insistence on the 
impossibility of this purification is motivated both by the inseparability of reason and carnal, 
sensory experience and the indispensability of sensory experience to reason.35  However, the sort 
of empiricism that Hamann touts here is quite different from the Humean variety.  Far from 
leading to skepticism or idealism, his empiricism is adamantly realistic, entailing access to 
                                               
34 By dubbing the author of the CPR a Kunstrichter, Hamann is not so subtly contesting Kant’s 
claim that criticism, as he uses the term, is not in fact about books (N3, 279). 
35 ZH5, 265: “Erfahrung und Offenbarung sind einerlei, und unentbehrliche Flügel oder Krücken 
unserer Vernunft, wenn sie nicht lahm bleiben und kriechen soll.” N1, 298: “Nicht nur das ganze 
Waarhaus der Vernunft, sondern selbst die Schatzkammer des Glaubens beruhen auf diesem 
Stock [auf den 5 Sinne].”  
 objects of external experience.36  As for the alleged “purification” from experience, he compares 
the implication of its pretension to that of providing the “infallible philosopher’s stone,” thus 
turning the tables once again, as he does in Review, on Kant’s claim that the relation of the CPR 
to the metaphysics of the schools is like that of “chemistry to alchemy.”37  
 
The third purification – the principal focus of the rest of the Metacritique – is the most disastrous 
since it robs reasons of its “only (first and last) organon and criterion.” 
  The third, supreme and, as it were, incendiary purism then concerns  
language, the sole, first, and last organon and criterion of reason, without 
M4 any other credential [Creditiv] than tradition and use [Usum]... Receptivity of  
language and spontaneity of concepts!  From this twofold source of ambiguity 
pure reason gathers all the elements of its doctrinaire pretensions, addiction to 
doubt, and institution as critic.38  
In the final line Hamann substitutes his own colorful if damning wording (Rechthaberey, 
Zweifelsucht und Kunstrichterschaft) for Kant’s three stages in the history of reason (dogmatism, 
skepticism, and criticism). According to the Prolegomena, if metaphysics is to establish anything 
in the name of pure reason, then its sole “credential” is the answer to the question of how 
synthetic a priori judgments are possible (AA IV, 278). According to M4, language, not reason, 
provides the credentials. Hamann adds that Kant, by assigning reason a prerogative beyond 
linguistic use, not only forfeits its ultimate warrant, but also idealizes it to the point of making it 
into a kind of “idol.”39 Far from being infallible, reason is inherently ambiguous, since it draws 
                                               
36 See n. 27 above.  
37 The pretension to that stone is necessary to “Catholicism and despotism,” Hamann adds, 
referencing once again Kant’s talk of the court of reason to which the holiness of religion and the 
majesty of law-giving must submit. On parallels between “the chemical tree of Diana” and 
Demetrius, see Bayer 2002, 343f. 
38 N3, 284; ZH5, 95 “Without words, no reason – no world.”  See Bayer 1990, 437. 
39 Hamann juxtaposes Idol with the Ideal der reinen Vernunft, the divinity as conceived in the 
CPR (N3, 284); see, too, ZH5, 94; Bayer 2002, 272. ZH6, 163: “Kant macht Gott zum Ideal ohne 
zu wissen, daß seine reine Vernunft eben dasselbe ist,...” 
 on a combination of “receptivity to language and spontaneity of concepts.” 40 Every utterance of 
a natural language combines this indebtedness to the tradition and contingent history of words 
with the utterer’s own spontaneous use of them.  
 
By challenging Kant’s pretension to a reason unfiltered and unfazed by language, M4 introduces 
an alternative conception of reason, embedding it in the history of linguistic usage, the source of 
that usage’s tools and criteria. Just as that usage is conjoined with a tradition, so it combines with 
a certain spontaneity on the part of the person using concepts, even as those concepts and their 
use depend upon the person’s receptivity to language. 
 
As evidence of the ambiguity flagged in M4 (or more precisely, its “hereditary defect”), Hamann 
cites the contingency of the term ‘metaphysics,’ deriving as it does from an accidental 
classification of Aristotle’s so-named text after his physics documents.  He insinuates further that 
Kant exploits that underlying ambiguity by developing a terminology that behaves towards every 
other language (the language of crafts, the meadow, the mountain, and the schools) “like 
quicksilver to the remaining metals” (N3, 285). The point of the parallel of Kant’s terminology 
of pure reason, grounded on that fundamental ambiguity, with mercury is precisely the latter’s 
slipperiness and fluidity, the difficulty of getting a hold of it, in contrast to the solidity and fixity 
of the other metals. This ambiguity and the idealization that it permits explains, too, the 
pretension and false promise of taking leave of Volkssprache in favor of “a pure language of 
reason.” This artificial language “abuses” language’s fitting role in empirical knowledge by 
treating its words as “nothing but hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations” (ibid.). 
 
After challenging the peremptory character of Kant’s conception and language of pure reason, 
Hamann excuses himself from having to give a deduction to prove “the genealogical priority of 
language” over the logical functions (upon which Kant draws). Instead he makes the following 
broader point: 
                                               
40 The common language of the people (Volkssprache) provides the most beautiful image for 
“the synthetic mysteries of both corresponding and contradictory formations [Gestalten] a priori 
and a posteriori” (N3, 287). 
 Not only does the entire capacity to think rest upon language… Language is also 
the middle point of reason’s misunderstanding with itself, partly on account of 
M5  the frequent coincidence of the largest and smallest concepts, their emptiness 
and fullness in ideal propositions, and partly on account of the infinite prerogative 
of figures of speech over figures of inference, and much more of the same. 41  
While M4 asserts reason’s dependency on language for its tools and criteria, M5 adds its 
dependency upon language for its missteps. Reason is inherently prone to fallibility, as Kant 
suggests in the Transcendental Dialectic, but it is, Hamann contends, a linguistic fallibility, a 
fallibility rooted in certain abstract uses (or misuses) of language by reason. In ordinary and 
efficacious uses of language, terms with supposedly the widest extension, like those with the 
supposedly smallest extension, are hardly forthcoming. But in the idealized propositions of pure 
reason, we entertain such concepts. Herein lies the feeding ground for the seductiveness of 
abstract words, flagged by Berkeley. 
 
This criticism of Kant’s language of pure reason, language purified of its effective use, leads to 
another positive claim about language itself.  
Words, therefore, have an aesthetic and logical capacity. As visible and aural 
objects, they belong, along with their elements, to sensoriness and intuition, but in 
accord with the spirit of their deployment and meaning, they belong to the 
M6 understanding and concepts. Consequently, words are as much pure and empirical 
intuitions as pure and empirical concepts: empirical, because sensation of sight 
and hearing is produced by them; pure insofar as their meaning is determined by 
nothing that belongs to those sensations. (N3, 288) 
While the parallel with Kant’s terminology is forced, M6 helps explains Hamann’s insistence on 
reason’s linguistic grounding. Recall that Hamann’s initial target (M3) is reason in the broad yet 
autonomous sense that, by virtue of underlying all sources of knowledge, is singularly in a 
position to pass judgment on them. M4 and M5 offer an alternative to that account, complete with 
                                               
41 N3, 286. Is Hamann shifting attention in this context back to reason as the capacity to infer? 
Perhaps, but talk of the infinite prerogative of figures of speech can also be read as iterating the 
highly limited scope of purely formal reason. 
 an explanation for misunderstandings. Echoing observations in the Review (R2), M6 adds to the 
alternative by drawing out the rich complexity of language at work in reasoning. In the 
experience of words, we experience not only intuitions, concepts, and the difference between 
them, but also their original unity in that difference. Reason can seize upon and operate with 
differences that originate in the concrete experiences of language in all its rich variety, not least 
the coincidence of receptivity and spontaneity in everyday discourse. 
 
2. Reasoning within Synkatabasis  
From the foregoing review, the outline of Hamann’s conception of reason emerges. He conceives 
reason – and deems it necessary to conceive it – within certain nominalist (M1), historical, 
empirical (R1, M2), and linguistic (M4) constraints. Thanks to these constraints, reason is 
heteronomous (M3), understandably fallible (M5) yet holistic, replete with natural yet contingent 
opposites and a capacity to hold them together in their defining unity (R2, M6). In R2 he implies 
that, in our spontaneous capacity of conceptualizing, we experience the oppositions on which the 
CPR rests (prius and posterius, analysis and synthesis). This observation helps explain, too, as 
noted above, why he characterizes the oppositions as “natural” and “contingent,” qualities that 
cannot be founded upon a rational necessity but also have no need of such grounding, since they 
are the qualities of the underlying language itself. While in R2 Hamann implies that reason is 
dependent upon an experience of the coincidence of certain key oppositions, in M5 and M6 he 
makes an analogous point with respect to its dependence upon language. In the use of words, we 
experience a combination of intuitions and concepts, despite their inherent opposition (M6). 
Language can lead us astray when, taking leave of its ordinary use, we pretend to entertain 
concepts in “ideal propositions” (M4, M5). 
 
Yet even if this outline of Hamann’s concept of reason is accurate, it is hardly adequate. It leaves 
unanswered how precisely reason operates in his view. After all, reason’s dependency upon 
experience and tradition does not eliminate its distinctiveness, since they are arguably in need of 
reason as well. Above all, the foregoing outline omits consideration of the most central feature of 
his conception of reason, namely, its place and working within a revealed, religious perspective.  
 
 To be sure, allowances must be made for different senses of ‘reason’ within Hamann’s writings. 
Given his nominalism, Hamann has no use, as noted earlier, for the personification – ultimately, 
the divinization – of “universal human reason,” itself “a mere word of art” (Bildwort) (N3, 106). 
He deems the so-called “healthiness of reason ... the most convenient, high-handed, and 
shameless [sort of] self-glorification,” presupposing everything that is supposed to be proved 
(N3, 189). Even as he regards trust in reason, so construed, as a “dangerous superstition” and “no 
way to truth” (ZH5, 95), he is no less critical of “academic reason” (Schulvernunft), preoccupied, 
as it is, with the distinction between idealism and realism (ZH7, 165-76).  
 
Yet, in contrast to this sense of reason, there is “a correct and genuine” reason which knows 
nothing of this “fabricated distinction” (ZH7, 165). Genuine reason and faith are, he adds, 
equally in need of each other.42 These remarks are made thirteen months before his death, but 
thirty-seven years earlier, as a twenty year old, he expresses the same high regard for reason, 
deeming it one of the means by which the joy of a Christian soul takes hold (N4, 17). Clearly, he 
regards reason in some sense as necessary to religion. “Without language we would have no 
reason, without reason no religion, and without these three essential aspects of our nature, neither 
mind [Geist] nor bond of society” (N3, 231). But if religion depends upon reason, it is a reason 
made possible by the language of God, “the mother of reason and revelation.”43  
 
The reference to revelation in this last remark holds perhaps the key to understanding Hamann’s 
conception of reason. Placing reason – “the source of all truths and all errors” (ZH7, 172) – 
within the context of God’s revelation underscores not simply its fallibility, but also its 
defectiveness, its use by imperfect, indeed, sinful creatures. From this vantage point, the idea of 
pure reason, capable of sitting in judgment of everything, appears not simply mythical but 
sacrilegious, a prideful work of fiction, a delusion of grandeur. The delusion is not simply that 
reason or, better, reasoning is free of experience – including motivations at work in it – but also 
that those motivations themselves are pure. 
                                               
42 See n. 14 above.  
43 ZH6, 108; see, too, ZH6, 296: “Vernunft und Schrift sind im Grunde Einerlei = Sprache 
Gottes.”  
  
Yet although Scripture explains this pride, reason is the key to recognizing it (the “self-
knowledge” that Kant in the Preface calls the “most difficult” of reason’s tasks).  Herein lies 
Hamann’s reason for dwelling on Socrates in response to his initial encounter with Kant. In a 
reference to “self-knowledge as the trip through hell,” Hamann observes that reason is “holy, 
right, and good,” because it yields “cognition of our thoroughgoing lack of knowledge, brought 
on by our sinful condition.” Fulfilling reason in this sense, philosophy serves, he adds, as the 
rigorous taskmaster on the road to belief (Orbil zum Glauben) (N2, 108). So reasoning is the 
hallowed way of coming to know ourselves, even as it leads to the recognition of both the 
limitations of our reasoning capacities (along with our sinfulness) and our need for faith. 
 
But just how exactly does reason do this? What are the tools, means, and ways of reason within 
this revealed, religious context?  Once again, answers to these questions begin with the nature of 
revelation. Revelation is a communication and the primary task of reason is to interpret and 
understand what God is communicating (N1, 8-9). Just as Scripture can only speak to us through 
allegories and metaphors (Gleichnisse), so reasoning relies upon images of external things, 
taking them as “allegories and signs” (e.g., in Agnus Dei, the lamb serves as an image of divine 
innocence; the use of grasp, fassen – a movement of the hand – to designate an act of knowing). 
Misuse creeps in when that reliance is forgotten or supposedly foregone.44 In its reliance upon 
metaphor and parables, reasoning proceeds – it infers – but, like Socrates, through analogy (per 
analogiam).45 By regarding A as B (“Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?”), I can consider 
and potentially infer that some features of B transfer to some degree to A (as in Shakespeare’s 
sonnet). Analogical reasoning does not yield the clarity and distinctness sometimes attributed to 
mathematical inferences, but a degree of vagueness is perfectly compatible with seeing the truth 
and essence of things (N1, 112, 302).  
 
                                               
44 See n. 27 above and N1, 157; N3, 285, 385. 
45 N1, 112, 157-58; N2, 61; Hamann also reasons “metaschematically,” casting light on one set 
of relationships by juxtaposing it with another (N2, 150; N3, 144); see note 20 above.  
 Genuine reasoning is accordingly analogical, as it attempts to interpret God’s signs and 
understand His words. It is also historical, founded as it is upon the ongoing event of creation, 
incarnation, and salvation. However, it is not historical in the sense of looking for causal 
connections within a particular time-frame. Instead, without taking leave of history, it searches 
for the significance of those connections or, more precisely, what God is communicating to us 
historically through them. In this regard, reasoning for Hamann is historical in the sense of being 
typological, a term from Biblical hermeneutics signifying a mode of interpretation often 
contrasted with allegorical interpretation. Whereas allegorical interpretations of Scripture look 
for indications of a time-transcending truth, typological interpretations look for the bearing of 
actual events on future ones that make up the single history of salvation.46 
 
Reasoning has this analogical and typological character precisely because it occurs within the 
historical context of revelation as the effort to interpret God’s communication to us – in nature 
and in Scripture (N1, 83; N3, 32). In each of these forms of communication, the act of 
communicating and what is communicated are fundamentally similar. Like the creation and the 
incarnation – or, better, in continuity with them – the act of communicating is an act of divine 
love, communicating God’s love for humanity.47 In the act, God lowers Himself, communicating 
with and making Himself vulnerable to His creation. Revelation (“every communication of God 
to reasoning creatures”), like the creation and the incarnation, presupposes this divine act of 
stooping down with (synkatabasis), descending, accommodating (condescensio, accomodatio). 
“God a writer! – the inspiration behind this book is a lowering and descending of God that is just 
as great as the Father’s creation and the Son’s Incarnation.”48 Hamann’s own reasoning-and-
                                               
46 N2, 175; Gründer 1958, 138-151; Jørgensen 1968, 170-72; O’Flaherty 1979, 88-89; Fritsch 
1999, 31-34, 104.  
47 Carnal elements of this love – embodied, sexual, sensual, aesthetic, and affective – also 
characterize reason’s response to it. A more complete treatment of Hamann’s view of reason 
would have to address these features. 
48 N1, 5, 30. 91. 97, 299; N2, 43; and, above all, N3, 27: “...communicatio göttlicher und 
menschlicher idiomatum...ein Grundgesetz und der Hauptschlüssel aller unsrer Erkenntniß und 
der ganzen sichtbaren Haushaltung”; Blanke 1928, 30-31; Gajek 1967, 58-61. 
 writing attempts to imitate and be part of this overriding history.  This history, centered on the 
Incarnation, is the focal point of every being; thus Hamann’s account amounts to a kind of onto-
Christology. 
 
If synkatabasis is the underlying presupposition of reason within the limits of religion, it is also 
an expression of a seemingly universal and universally recursive principle in Hamann’s thinking: 
coincidentia oppositorum.49 Hamann takes seriously, much like Hegel after him, not only the 
presence of contradictions but their inherent inevitability. Again prefiguring Hegel (at least on 
certain readings of his metaphysics), Hamann appeals to the coincidence of opposites as the 
“sufficient reason” for those contradictions (ZH 4, 287). But unlike Hegel, Hamann does not see 
this coincidence issuing into some supervening unity. The unity is nothing but their coincidence 
– an historical contingency – and we always find ourselves only on one side of it at any given 
point in time. I find myself at rest or in motion but not simultaneously at rest and in motion in the 
same respect, though I only understand myself to be in one state by reason of the opposite as 
well. The Incarnation epitomizes this coincidence; hence, the gloss on Hamann’s conception of 
reason within the limits of religion as an onto-Christology. 
 
3. Concluding critical remarks 
Reason within the limits of religion alone is misleading if it suggests that religion confines 
reason. Hamann’s onto-Christological use of reason requires its co-extensiveness with religion, 
in particular, a commitment to the living creation and revelation, centered in the incarnation, 
where these limits constitute – humming in an ancient key – its perfection, not its impediments.  
 
Still, his conception of reason is problematic in at least two respects. He leaves his thesis about 
reason’s dependency upon language (like his nominalism and his insinuation of Kant’s historical 
dependency) underdetermined to a fault. Neither is the claim that “reason is language” helpful, 
without further ado, since the sentence structure can indicate identity, metonymy, or inclusion (as 
                                               
49 ZH 5, 327; ZH 4, 462; N2, 40; N3, 311, 315; Gründer 1958, 150; Metzke 1967, 245. 
 in ‘orange is fruit’) (to name only a few possibilities). It is one thing to claim that a reason 
purified of language is an illusion, quite another thing to show how language affects reason.50   
 
A final problem concerns the status of the overlapping themes of coincidentia oppositorum and 
synkatabasis that frame his onto-Christology. Since these themes act as final constraints on 
reason, they appear to have an ahistorical status at odds with Hamann’s anti-systematic pretenses. 
Given the nature of his invocation of these themes, Hamann appears to overreach in supposing 







                                               
50 So, too, it is unclear in what sense truth (N3, 191), experience (N1, 298), and tradition (N3, 39) 
serve as constraints for a particular use of language, since it remains unclear how they are 
distinguishable from a particular use themselves.  
